Pages that link to "Item:Q1926598"
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The following pages link to Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598):
Displaying 12 items.
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets (Q404743) (← links)
- Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816) (← links)
- Comparative statics in matching markets (Q1176684) (← links)
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets (Q1684134) (← links)
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches (Q2049465) (← links)
- Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (Q3382383) (← links)
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931) (← links)
- Incentives in matching markets: Counting and comparing manipulating agents (Q6076915) (← links)