Pages that link to "Item:Q1959114"
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The following pages link to The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries (Q1959114):
Displaying 15 items.
- International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions' control (Q475308) (← links)
- The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q506806) (← links)
- Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements (Q651348) (← links)
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q976996) (← links)
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought? (Q1038409) (← links)
- Developing countries and environmental protection: Contract design in perfectly correlated environments (Q1307908) (← links)
- Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q2205813) (← links)
- Systematic uncertainty in self-enforcing international environmental agreements (Q2477725) (← links)
- Do voluntary international environmental agreements work? (Q2583761) (← links)
- Issue linkage (Q2675430) (← links)
- Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries (Q3184582) (← links)
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION (Q3616626) (← links)
- Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding (Q6047355) (← links)
- International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach (Q6550403) (← links)
- On the farsightedly and myopically stable international environmental agreements (Q6582911) (← links)
