The following pages link to Nirvikar Singh (Q205973):
Displaying 10 items.
- Moral hazard with a finite number of states (Q374966) (← links)
- Commitment and entry-deterrence in a model of duopoly (Q375116) (← links)
- Posterior-preserving information improvements and principal-agent relationships (Q1181232) (← links)
- Unilateral altruism may be beneficial: A game-theoretic illustration (Q1352151) (← links)
- Nash bargaining with the option to wait (Q1389745) (← links)
- Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria (Q3479761) (← links)
- (Q3840274) (← links)
- Foreign Technology, Spillovers, and R & D Policy (Q4368663) (← links)
- Implementation with partial verification (Q5944740) (← links)
- Contests where there is variation in the marginal productivity of effort (Q5955118) (← links)