Pages that link to "Item:Q2067358"
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The following pages link to When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives (Q2067358):
Displaying 6 items.
- Consistency and communication in committees (Q893390) (← links)
- Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice (Q2002366) (← links)
- Introducing difference into the Condorcet jury theorem (Q2353586) (← links)
- Why votes have value: instrumental voting with overconfidence and overestimation of others' errors (Q2442822) (← links)
- An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem* (Q4684813) (← links)
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information (Q4810828) (← links)