The following pages link to Essentially stable matchings (Q2178028):
Displaying 26 items.
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools (Q329714) (← links)
- Group robust stability in matching markets (Q665110) (← links)
- Characterization of super-stable matchings (Q832893) (← links)
- On stable matchings and flows (Q1736598) (← links)
- Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas (Q1757561) (← links)
- Stable matchings with couples (Q1917356) (← links)
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities (Q2051512) (← links)
- Quantile stable mechanisms (Q2052538) (← links)
- Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice (Q2061119) (← links)
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab (Q2067353) (← links)
- Matching with ownership (Q2075636) (← links)
- Matching through institutions (Q2173398) (← links)
- Jointly stable matchings (Q2424832) (← links)
- Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem (Q2667273) (← links)
- On Compatible Matchings (Q5049995) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism (Q6054914) (← links)
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? (Q6063102) (← links)
- CATCHMENT AREAS, STRATIFICATION, AND ACCESS TO BETTER SCHOOLS (Q6122165) (← links)
- School choice with transferable student characteristics (Q6148575) (← links)
- Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem (Q6170019) (← links)
- Unique stable matchings (Q6176757) (← links)
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design (Q6536583) (← links)
- The core of school choice problems (Q6559104) (← links)
- Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent (Q6565778) (← links)
- (Non-)obvious manipulability of rank-minimizing mechanisms (Q6596162) (← links)
- Stability vs. no justified envy (Q6665684) (← links)
