Pages that link to "Item:Q2307384"
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The following pages link to Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little (Q2307384):
Displaying 12 items.
- The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements (Q385170) (← links)
- Can international environmental cooperation be bought: comment (Q421801) (← links)
- Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations (Q475286) (← links)
- Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements (Q651348) (← links)
- The CO\(_2\) abatement game: Costs, incentives, and the enforceability of a sub-global coalition (Q1583304) (← links)
- Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment? (Q1672878) (← links)
- Catastrophe and cooperation (Q1741213) (← links)
- Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements (Q2231405) (← links)
- Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements (Q2427710) (← links)
- Environmental agreements, research and technological spillovers (Q2670593) (← links)
- THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT (Q3060265) (← links)
- COALITION FORMATION IN A GLOBAL WARMING GAME: HOW THE DESIGN OF PROTOCOLS AFFECTS THE SUCCESS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING (Q3616618) (← links)