Pages that link to "Item:Q2371152"

The following pages link to The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games (Q2371152):

Displaying 10 items.

• Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems (Q431811) (← links)
• The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency (Q521883) (← links)
• The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games (Q776857) (← links)
• The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note (Q817262) (← links)
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations (Q892979) (← links)
• Stable agreements through liability rules: a multi-choice game approach to the social cost problem (Q2236191) (← links)
• Socially structured games (Q2370085) (← links)
• A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES (Q3402040) (← links)
• A decomposition of transferable utility games: structure of transferable utility games (Q5249114) (← links)
• Collective decision making in an international river pollution model (Q6550464) (← links)