Pages that link to "Item:Q2384877"
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The following pages link to An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit (Q2384877):
Displaying 10 items.
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency (Q683523) (← links)
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers (Q1680148) (← links)
- On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
- A novel multiperson game approach for linguistic multicriteria decision making problems (Q1718738) (← links)
- Stability and voting by committees with exit (Q1762858) (← links)
- Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: a `state of the art' model (Q2013360) (← links)
- Simple collective equilibria in stopping games (Q2050982) (← links)
- On exiting after voting (Q2491086) (← links)
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution (Q5953416) (← links)
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting (Q6164813) (← links)