Pages that link to "Item:Q2385127"
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The following pages link to Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules (Q2385127):
Displaying 29 items.
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models (Q284375) (← links)
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control (Q314421) (← links)
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey (Q334204) (← links)
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules (Q449045) (← links)
- On the manipulability of voting rules: the case of \(4\) and \(5\) alternatives (Q449050) (← links)
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes (Q459405) (← links)
- Ensuring every candidate wins under positional voting (Q839624) (← links)
- Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs (Q952695) (← links)
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour (Q1042332) (← links)
- Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable (Q1178175) (← links)
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences (Q1331066) (← links)
- Manipulative elicitation -- a new attack on elections with incomplete preferences (Q1637215) (← links)
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation (Q1680740) (← links)
- Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing (Q1786787) (← links)
- The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and Condorcet consistent rules (Q1811251) (← links)
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election? (Q1887542) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Strategic voting and nomination (Q2247944) (← links)
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences (Q2346947) (← links)
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory (Q2426958) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules (Q2450082) (← links)
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis (Q2463576) (← links)
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election (Q2500745) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
- Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (Q5053696) (← links)
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules (Q5964648) (← links)
- Comparing the Manipulability of Approval Voting and Borda (Q6063698) (← links)
- Bivariate scoring rules: unifying the characterizations of positional scoring rules and Kemeny's rule (Q6564045) (← links)
