Pages that link to "Item:Q2427710"

The following pages link to Dynamic effects on the stability of international environmental agreements (Q2427710):

Displaying 33 items.

• The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game (Q322669) (← links)
• The effects of the length of the period of commitment on the size of stable international environmental agreements (Q385170) (← links)
• Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served? (Q475281) (← links)
• Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations (Q475286) (← links)
• The effects of R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q506806) (← links)
• Dynamic games in the economics of natural resources: a survey (Q545656) (← links)
• Stability of international environmental agreements in leadership model (Q611070) (← links)
• Environmental policy and stable collusion: the case of a dynamic polluting oligopoly (Q631246) (← links)
• Largest consistent set in international environmental agreements (Q651348) (← links)
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q976996) (← links)
• Simulating the impact of heterogeneity on stability and effectiveness of international environmental agreements (Q1740567) (← links)
• Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games (Q1982854) (← links)
• Dynamic game study of multi-channel supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation (Q2112992) (← links)
• Cooperation in dynamic games with asymmetric players: the role of social preferences (Q2172101) (← links)
• Coalitional stability conditions in multicriteria dynamic games (Q2185644) (← links)
• Sharing R\&D investments in international environmental agreements with asymmetric countries (Q2205813) (← links)
• Emergence of competition and cooperation in an evolutionary resource war model (Q2205815) (← links)
• Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements (Q2231405) (← links)
• Producer's choice of design-for-environment under environmental taxation (Q2242252) (← links)
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little (Q2307384) (← links)
• Can justice and fairness enlarge international environmental agreements? (Q2344934) (← links)
• International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight (Q2354544) (← links)
• THE SIZE OF FARSIGHTED STABLE COALITIONS IN A GAME OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT (Q3060265) (← links)
• HOW RAPID SHOULD EMISSION REDUCTION BE? A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH (Q3060267) (← links)
• Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries (Q3184582) (← links)
• (Q4467804) (← links)
• COLLABORATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (Q4916137) (← links)
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements (Q4979986) (← links)
• (Q5229996) (← links)
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements (Q6105351) (← links)
• Can partial cooperation between developed and developing countries be stable? (Q6106556) (← links)
• Do small players undermine cooperation in asymmetric games? (Q6548528) (← links)
• International environmental agreements with developed and developing countries in a dynamic approach (Q6550403) (← links)