Pages that link to "Item:Q2452124"

The following pages link to A new single transferable vote method and its axiomatic justification (Q2452124):

Displaying 7 items.

• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method (Q622582) (← links)
• On the practical possibility of a 'no show paradox' under the single transferable vote (Q1069835) (← links)
• The communication burden of single transferable vote, in practice (Q1617674) (← links)
• A universal voting system based on the potential method (Q1751870) (← links)
• The expanding approvals rule: improving proportional representation and monotonicity (Q2179446) (← links)
• (Q3613096) (← links)
• Toward Computing the Margin of Victory in Single Transferable Vote Elections (Q5139621) (← links)