Pages that link to "Item:Q2490939"
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The following pages link to Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation (Q2490939):
Displaying 7 items.
- Strategy-proofness and weighted voting (Q991312) (← links)
- Yet another characterization of the majority rule (Q1738415) (← links)
- Parity dependence of a majority rule characterization on the Condorcet domain (Q1942927) (← links)
- Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives (Q2340271) (← links)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (Q2365784) (← links)
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives (Q2460080) (← links)
- Non-manipulable Social Welfare Functions when Preferences are Fuzzy (Q3632766) (← links)