Pages that link to "Item:Q2568816"
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The following pages link to Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain (Q2568816):
Displaying 9 items.
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules (Q449045) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- Reduction-consistency in collective choice problems (Q855361) (← links)
- Self-selective social choice functions (Q930487) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray (Q2088894) (← links)
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains (Q2417401) (← links)
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions (Q5964647) (← links)
- Selection closedness and scoring correspondences (Q6624506) (← links)