Pages that link to "Item:Q3057835"

The following pages link to Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (Q3057835):

Displaying 50 items.

• Assignment problems with complementarities (Q308621) (← links)
• An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q328558) (← links)
• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach (Q337801) (← links)
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods (Q431227) (← links)
• An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q485790) (← links)
• Assigning agents to a line (Q485809) (← links)
• When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? (Q504391) (← links)
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints (Q508390) (← links)
• On the operation of multiple matching markets (Q516981) (← links)
• Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences (Q553528) (← links)
• Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments? (Q840694) (← links)
• Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q848608) (← links)
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions (Q898694) (← links)
• Finding all stable matchings with couples (Q908185) (← links)
• Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects (Q1005770) (← links)
• The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (Q1622384) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach (Q1649093) (← links)
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness (Q1651219) (← links)
• The object allocation problem with random priorities (Q1651226) (← links)
• The impossibility of extending random dictatorship to weak preferences (Q1668159) (← links)
• Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems (Q1668490) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object (Q1680102) (← links)
• Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment (Q1697833) (← links)
• Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects (Q2002068) (← links)
• Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial (Q2089061) (← links)
• A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching (Q2103007) (← links)
• Trading probabilities along cycles (Q2138374) (← links)
• Constrained random matching (Q2155237) (← links)
• On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model (Q2205990) (← links)
• Size versus fairness in the assignment problem (Q2343388) (← links)
• Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms (Q2359384) (← links)
• Efficient lottery design (Q2362194) (← links)
• Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem (Q2411514) (← links)
• Assigning more students to their top choices: a comparison of tie-breaking rules (Q2416641) (← links)
• Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand (Q2437801) (← links)
• The ``Boston'' school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (Q2447152) (← links)
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences (Q2453443) (← links)
• The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost (Q2460223) (← links)
• Making just school assignments (Q2516227) (← links)
• Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design (Q2672280) (← links)
• Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship (Q2673211) (← links)
• Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities (Q2931695) (← links)
• Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms (Q3382406) (← links)
• The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix (Q3465944) (← links)
• Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority (Q3635022) (← links)
• Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (Q4586003) (← links)
• Stable Matching in Large Economies (Q5225243) (← links)
• Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms (Q5964696) (← links)
• On rank dominance of tie‐breaking rules (Q6076906) (← links)