Pages that link to "Item:Q3394931"
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The following pages link to When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results (Q3394931):
Displaying 14 items.
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences (Q477355) (← links)
- The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings (Q523460) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957) (← links)
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets? (Q1294009) (← links)
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets (Q1381985) (← links)
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems (Q1762420) (← links)
- Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments (Q1867834) (← links)
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests (Q1926598) (← links)
- Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets (Q1984501) (← links)
- Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable (Q2002070) (← links)
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989) (← links)
- Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems (Q2424243) (← links)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria (Q2453419) (← links)
- Capacity design in school choice (Q6584598) (← links)