Pages that link to "Item:Q3467653"
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The following pages link to Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems (Q3467653):
Displaying 18 items.
- A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing (Q1690964) (← links)
- An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement (Q1714944) (← links)
- Efficient crowdsourcing of unknown experts using bounded multi-armed bandits (Q2014933) (← links)
- Robustness and approximation for the linear contract design (Q2039672) (← links)
- Principal-agent problem under the linear contract (Q2084610) (← links)
- Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts (Q2124461) (← links)
- More for less: adaptive labeling payments in online labor markets (Q2218383) (← links)
- Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration (Q3387959) (← links)
- Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money (Q3460803) (← links)
- Competing bandits: learning under competition (Q4993317) (← links)
- Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Games (Q5080666) (← links)
- A Differential Privacy Mechanism that Accounts for Network Effects for Crowdsourcing Systems (Q5139602) (← links)
- The Complexity of Contracts (Q5856150) (← links)
- Learning approximately optimal contracts (Q6069846) (← links)
- Learning approximately optimal contracts (Q6109528) (← links)
- Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization (Q6161464) (← links)
- On improved interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets (Q6164503) (← links)
- An \(\alpha \)-regret analysis of adversarial bilateral trade (Q6665707) (← links)