Pages that link to "Item:Q3670860"

The following pages link to Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (Q3670860):

Displaying 50 items.

• Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality (Q281354) (← links)
• Optimal insurance under adverse selection and ambiguity aversion (Q345188) (← links)
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium (Q345200) (← links)
• Mixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium under \(l_1\cap l_\infty\)-norm (Q398504) (← links)
• Strategy-proof stochastic assignment (Q402069) (← links)
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
• Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information (Q417713) (← links)
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals (Q423731) (← links)
• On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information (Q483925) (← links)
• Incentive compatible market design with applications (Q495753) (← links)
• Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information (Q497941) (← links)
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information (Q508409) (← links)
• Ambiguous implementation: the partition model (Q514494) (← links)
• On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules (Q517007) (← links)
• Implementation under ambiguity (Q522998) (← links)
• Interim third-party selection in bargaining (Q523532) (← links)
• Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem (Q524967) (← links)
• Bilateral trading with naive traders (Q550198) (← links)
• Rules for aggregating information (Q622567) (← links)
• Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies (Q632974) (← links)
• Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism (Q645642) (← links)
• Second best efficiency and the English auction (Q645656) (← links)
• Symmetric mechanism design (Q684174) (← links)
• Starting small and commitment (Q700110) (← links)
• The veil of public ignorance (Q705834) (← links)
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule (Q765225) (← links)
• Cooperative games with incomplete information (Q792890) (← links)
• Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms (Q804453) (← links)
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade (Q805485) (← links)
• Efficient compromising (Q840684) (← links)
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
• On robust constitution design (Q885072) (← links)
• Equilibrium theory under ambiguity (Q898665) (← links)
• Ex ante efficiency implies incentive compatibility (Q926232) (← links)
• Ex post implementation (Q932807) (← links)
• Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models (Q934897) (← links)
• Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game (Q943345) (← links)
• All-stage strong correlated equilibrium (Q972139) (← links)
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results (Q1001138) (← links)
• Mechanism design with collusive supervision (Q1001815) (← links)
• Interim efficient allocations under uncertainty (Q1001830) (← links)
• Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery (Q1006573) (← links)
• Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints (Q1062888) (← links)
• Robust trading mechanisms (Q1087124) (← links)
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining (Q1092778) (← links)
• Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply (Q1115823) (← links)
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information (Q1119188) (← links)
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency (Q1120444) (← links)
• The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms (Q1121150) (← links)
• Efficiency and adverse selection (Q1173869) (← links)