Pages that link to "Item:Q3926312"
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The following pages link to An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees (Q3926312):
Displaying 20 items.
- It is difficult to tell if there is a Condorcet spanning tree (Q328521) (← links)
- How hard is it to tell which is a Condorcet committee? (Q459394) (← links)
- Voting and vagueness (Q516326) (← links)
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates (Q682478) (← links)
- Social acceptability of Condorcet committees (Q777455) (← links)
- On the rule of \(k\) names (Q993784) (← links)
- The Condorcet criterion and committee selection (Q1060661) (← links)
- Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. (Q1410900) (← links)
- A social choice approach to ordinal group activity selection (Q1642162) (← links)
- Coincidence of Condorcet committees (Q1707115) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules (Q1729676) (← links)
- When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? (Q2088905) (← links)
- Electing a committee with dominance constraints (Q2095947) (← links)
- Condorcet winning sets (Q2341123) (← links)
- On stable rules for selecting committees (Q2358564) (← links)
- Multiwinner analogues of the plurality rule: axiomatic and algorithmic perspectives (Q2417370) (← links)
- Properties of multiwinner voting rules (Q2628711) (← links)
- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? (Q2829680) (← links)
- POPULAR SPANNING TREES (Q5404516) (← links)
- Gehrlein stable committee with multi-modal preferences (Q6109543) (← links)