Pages that link to "Item:Q3932551"

The following pages link to Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points (Q3932551):

Displaying 50 items.

• House allocation when availability of houses may change unexpectedly (Q277304) (← links)
• Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems (Q308625) (← links)
• Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach (Q308656) (← links)
• Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks (Q323311) (← links)
• Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods (Q402062) (← links)
• Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules (Q417718) (← links)
• Non-bossy social classification (Q418045) (← links)
• A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems (Q433811) (← links)
• Secure implementation in production economies (Q459407) (← links)
• Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization (Q518710) (← links)
• Strategy-proof coalition formation (Q532687) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing (Q532731) (← links)
• Incentive compatibility without compensation (Q674234) (← links)
• Non-bossiness (Q682486) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems (Q700121) (← links)
• The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity (Q732932) (← links)
• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives (Q759609) (← links)
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds (Q765217) (← links)
• Influence in private-goods allocation (Q776963) (← links)
• Nonmanipulability in two dimensions (Q802458) (← links)
• Decentralized college admissions under single application (Q826044) (← links)
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations (Q836935) (← links)
• On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties (Q839623) (← links)
• Constrained school choice (Q840677) (← links)
• Children crying at birthday parties. Why? (Q878403) (← links)
• Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources (Q900413) (← links)
• A Hurwicz type result in a model with public good production (Q904839) (← links)
• Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on the cobb-Douglas domain of exchange economies (Q944260) (← links)
• Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms (Q969481) (← links)
• Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear (Q1029534) (← links)
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives (Q1054624) (← links)
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice (Q1069833) (← links)
• Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments (Q1162430) (← links)
• Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems (Q1202563) (← links)
• Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale (Q1270061) (← links)
• Efficient incentive compatible economies are perfectly competitive (Q1290837) (← links)
• An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money (Q1341475) (← links)
• Order independence for iterated weak dominance (Q1357404) (← links)
• Strategy-proof allotment rules (Q1367676) (← links)
• Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects (Q1581906) (← links)
• Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application (Q1633670) (← links)
• Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results (Q1697842) (← links)
• On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness (Q1704055) (← links)
• Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable (Q1729671) (← links)
• Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design (Q1735730) (← links)
• Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies (Q1764793) (← links)
• Strategy-proof risk sharing (Q1779831) (← links)
• Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods (Q1809494) (← links)
• Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees. (Q1812176) (← links)
• Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences (Q1824523) (← links)