The following pages link to Optimal Auction Design (Q3960505):
Displaying 50 items.
- Mechanism design and intentions (Q281379) (← links)
- All-pay auctions with pre- and post-bidding options (Q297319) (← links)
- Models for capacity and electricity market design (Q301054) (← links)
- Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (Q308640) (← links)
- Optimal minimum bids and inventory scrapping in sequential, single-unit, Vickrey auctions with demand learning (Q319629) (← links)
- Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers (Q320139) (← links)
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (Q320681) (← links)
- Auctions with resale: reserve prices and revenues (Q324171) (← links)
- Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders (Q337790) (← links)
- A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting (Q342509) (← links)
- Regular type distributions in mechanism design and \(\rho\)-concavity (Q361816) (← links)
- Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings (Q361828) (← links)
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities (Q368060) (← links)
- Information concentration in common value environments (Q370959) (← links)
- Competitive bidding with entry costs (Q375027) (← links)
- Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement (Q380841) (← links)
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps (Q380874) (← links)
- Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks (Q382330) (← links)
- A truthful constant approximation for maximizing the minimum load on related machines (Q388122) (← links)
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification (Q391782) (← links)
- Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction (Q397961) (← links)
- On the analysis of asymmetric first price auctions (Q403716) (← links)
- Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders (Q403964) (← links)
- False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives (Q403973) (← links)
- Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining (Q405548) (← links)
- Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations (Q405757) (← links)
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces (Q406380) (← links)
- Prizes and patents: using market signals to provide incentives for innovations (Q413512) (← links)
- Communication and efficiency in auctions (Q417694) (← links)
- Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels (Q420898) (← links)
- Dynamic lot-sizing in sequential online retail auctions (Q421653) (← links)
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information (Q422349) (← links)
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design (Q423718) (← links)
- What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals (Q423731) (← links)
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale (Q423750) (← links)
- Asymmetric partnerships (Q433189) (← links)
- Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction (Q435782) (← links)
- A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand (Q459393) (← links)
- On the value of using group discounts under price competition (Q460621) (← links)
- The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms (Q462849) (← links)
- The role of commitment in bilateral trade (Q472223) (← links)
- Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks (Q475377) (← links)
- An optimal slow Dutch auction (Q476150) (← links)
- Participation and exclusion in auctions (Q500495) (← links)
- Implementable and ex-post IR rules in bilateral trading with discrete values (Q502369) (← links)
- Efficient money burning in general domains (Q506525) (← links)
- Prediction and welfare in ad auctions (Q506530) (← links)
- Revenue and reserve prices in a probabilistic single item auction (Q513288) (← links)
- Optimal mechanisms with simple menus (Q516055) (← links)
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good (Q516975) (← links)
