Pages that link to "Item:Q4008555"

The following pages link to Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed (Q4008555):

Displaying 50 items.

• Order of limits in reputations (Q333475) (← links)
• A dynamic game of reputation and economic performances in nondemocratic regimes (Q385167) (← links)
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations (Q392656) (← links)
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns (Q405540) (← links)
• Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning (Q406376) (← links)
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems (Q533088) (← links)
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts (Q645669) (← links)
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations (Q665455) (← links)
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring (Q894041) (← links)
• Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics (Q894071) (← links)
• When is reputation bad? (Q932806) (← links)
• Reputation and exogenous private learning (Q1017801) (← links)
• When are nonanonymous players negligible? (Q1268593) (← links)
• Incentive contracts in two-sided moral hazards with multiple agents (Q1367910) (← links)
• Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device (Q1668267) (← links)
• Will any gossip do? Gossip does not need to be perfectly accurate to promote trust (Q1691367) (← links)
• Bounded memory and incomplete information (Q1753297) (← links)
• Managing the reputation of an award to motivate performance (Q1774606) (← links)
• Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests (Q1779817) (← links)
• Commitment and observability in games (Q1804635) (← links)
• Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. (Q1811548) (← links)
• Reputation with observed actions (Q1814938) (← links)
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information (Q1818297) (← links)
• Games with espionage (Q1885430) (← links)
• Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria (Q1934164) (← links)
• Audited reputation (Q1934883) (← links)
• Reputation from nested activities (Q1950352) (← links)
• A model of gradual information disclosure (Q2049479) (← links)
• Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games (Q2095262) (← links)
• Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem (Q2138082) (← links)
• Ransomware and reputation (Q2184009) (← links)
• Reputation and news suppression in the media industry (Q2206812) (← links)
• Posterior probabilities: dominance and optimism (Q2208818) (← links)
• Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game (Q2225985) (← links)
• The emergence of cooperation through leadership (Q2259411) (← links)
• Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets (Q2299461) (← links)
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games (Q2345217) (← links)
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships (Q2373776) (← links)
• Imperfect memory and choice under risk (Q2442847) (← links)
• Information asymmetry and reentry (Q2452970) (← links)
• Reputation and impermanent types (Q2483124) (← links)
• A reputation for honesty (Q2675407) (← links)
• Inspection games with long-run inspectors (Q3587577) (← links)
• (Q3639777) (← links)
• Occurrence of Deception Under the Oversight of a Regulator Having Reputation Concerns (Q4687466) (← links)
• Reputation Effects (Q5149733) (← links)
• Introducing to the evolution of preferences (Q5938044) (← links)
• Bad reputation with simple rating systems (Q6148366) (← links)
• Repeated communication with private lying costs (Q6166489) (← links)
• Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game (Q6194372) (← links)