Pages that link to "Item:Q4021530"
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The following pages link to Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem (Q4021530):
Displaying 35 items.
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market (Q387329) (← links)
- Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements (Q485745) (← links)
- Destructing the hold-up (Q553395) (← links)
- Holdup, search, and inefficiency (Q611996) (← links)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments (Q617587) (← links)
- Investment incentives in bilateral trading (Q645662) (← links)
- Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types (Q665452) (← links)
- Why sunk costs matter for bargaining outcomes: An evolutionary approach (Q697929) (← links)
- Common agency, organizational design and the hold-up problem (Q709071) (← links)
- Creative bargaining (Q1268634) (← links)
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment (Q1279614) (← links)
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment. (Q1421899) (← links)
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) (Q1592722) (← links)
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems (Q1601456) (← links)
- Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain (Q1651715) (← links)
- Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection (Q1672733) (← links)
- Holdups and holdouts: what do they have in common? (Q1925917) (← links)
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information (Q1934720) (← links)
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information (Q1934817) (← links)
- Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework (Q1934941) (← links)
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty (Q2030291) (← links)
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem (Q2099057) (← links)
- The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions (Q2154153) (← links)
- Strategic disaggregation in matching markets (Q2231418) (← links)
- Managing strategic inventories under investment in process improvement (Q2315633) (← links)
- Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency (Q2318134) (← links)
- The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup (Q2327845) (← links)
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem (Q2419597) (← links)
- Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments (Q3506466) (← links)
- The Hold-Up Problem in Government Contracting (Q4223363) (← links)
- Long-Term Partnership for Achieving Efficient Capacity Allocation (Q5129174) (← links)
- On the Coordination of Static and Dynamic Marketing Channels in a Duopoly with Advertising (Q5140354) (← links)
- Hold-Up, Asset Ownership, and Reference Points<sup>*</sup> (Q5850902) (← links)
- Mechanism design with general ex-ante investments (Q6100484) (← links)
- Algorithmic mechanism design with investment (Q6536779) (← links)
