Pages that link to "Item:Q4184582"

The following pages link to Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (Q4184582):

Displaying 50 items.

• Subjective evaluation versus public information (Q272293) (← links)
• A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types (Q281360) (← links)
• Optimal contract design in the joint economic lot size problem with multi-dimensional asymmetric information (Q323245) (← links)
• Asymmetric information in a bilateral monopoly (Q330436) (← links)
• A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting (Q342509) (← links)
• A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information (Q374796) (← links)
• False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives (Q403973) (← links)
• Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach (Q403981) (← links)
• Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information (Q405002) (← links)
• Communication and efficiency in auctions (Q417694) (← links)
• Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information (Q417713) (← links)
• Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains (Q439380) (← links)
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information (Q449184) (← links)
• Asking questions (Q485823) (← links)
• Consumer returns reduction and information revelation mechanism for a supply chain (Q512923) (← links)
• Interim third-party selection in bargaining (Q523532) (← links)
• Robust screening under ambiguity (Q526838) (← links)
• Corporate governance, stakeholder power, and executive compensation (Q538487) (← links)
• Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information (Q539469) (← links)
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (Q585101) (← links)
• On robustness of forward-looking in sponsored search auction (Q603916) (← links)
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information (Q617676) (← links)
• Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects (Q632972) (← links)
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (Q633787) (← links)
• Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle (Q634536) (← links)
• IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest (Q665782) (← links)
• Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets (Q666293) (← links)
• The impact of voluntary disclosure on a firm's investment policy (Q726256) (← links)
• Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information (Q751947) (← links)
• Regulation, competition, and asymmetric information (Q751969) (← links)
• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria (Q751980) (← links)
• The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts (Q753636) (← links)
• The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints (Q785532) (← links)
• Cooperative games with incomplete information (Q792890) (← links)
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents (Q794886) (← links)
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade (Q805485) (← links)
• All-or-nothing information control (Q807356) (← links)
• Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights (Q836879) (← links)
• Foreign ownership restrictions: a numerical approach (Q836963) (← links)
• Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (Q839608) (← links)
• Efficient trading with restriction (Q843741) (← links)
• Optimal insurance under costly falsification and costly, inexact verification (Q844672) (← links)
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values (Q848607) (← links)
• Communication and bargaining in the spatial model (Q869241) (← links)
• Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion (Q882553) (← links)
• Common agency with informed principals: menus \textit{and} signals (Q894045) (← links)
• Adverse selection without single crossing: monotone solutions (Q896942) (← links)
• Mergers between regulated firms with unknown efficiency gains (Q905169) (← links)
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information (Q912008) (← links)
• Revelation in informational dynamic settings (Q922251) (← links)