Pages that link to "Item:Q4262869"
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The following pages link to The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (Q4262869):
Displaying 21 items.
- Signaling drive over the long term (Q617561) (← links)
- Correlation and relative performance evaluation (Q665451) (← links)
- A theory of political cycles (Q1017789) (← links)
- Herding over the career (Q1292345) (← links)
- Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types (Q1757549) (← links)
- Type composition, career concerns, and signaling efforts (Q1934271) (← links)
- When does centralization undermine adaptation? (Q2095261) (← links)
- Managerial reputation, risk-taking, and imperfect capital markets (Q2098868) (← links)
- Simple equilibria in general contests (Q2155902) (← links)
- Rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio property (Q2231371) (← links)
- Imperfect memory and choice under risk (Q2442847) (← links)
- Mixed up? That's good for motivation (Q2460226) (← links)
- Strategic shirking: a theoretical analysis of multitasking and specialization (Q2812311) (← links)
- Transparency, career concerns, and incentives for acquiring expertise (Q2867471) (← links)
- The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns (Q2870451) (← links)
- INFORMATION, RISK SHARING, AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS (Q2980203) (← links)
- Optimal adaptive testing: Informativeness and incentives (Q4612469) (← links)
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation (Q6160125) (← links)
- Optimal transparency of monitoring capability (Q6163286) (← links)
- Data and incentives (Q6194371) (← links)
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games (Q6536588) (← links)
