Pages that link to "Item:Q4530979"
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The following pages link to Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems (Q4530979):
Displaying 17 items.
- An example of probability computations under the IAC assumption: the stability of scoring rules (Q449045) (← links)
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810) (← links)
- On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules (Q517007) (← links)
- A characterization of the plurality rule (Q694893) (← links)
- Self-selective social choice functions (Q930487) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions (Q1036585) (← links)
- Implementation via rights structures (Q1757583) (← links)
- Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray (Q2088894) (← links)
- Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains (Q2417401) (← links)
- Consistent representative democracy (Q2427119) (← links)
- An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems (Q2467515) (← links)
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study (Q2500704) (← links)
- In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution (Q2695431) (← links)
- Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem (Q5213648) (← links)
- Hyper-stable social welfare functions (Q5964647) (← links)
- Selection closedness and scoring correspondences (Q6624506) (← links)
