The following pages link to Optimal Contracts with Shirking (Q4922022):
Displaying 20 items.
- Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring (Q337806) (← links)
- Dynamic incentive contracts under no-commitment to periodic auditing and a non-retrospective penalty system (Q814831) (← links)
- A dynamic model of shirking and unemployment: private saving, public debt, and optimal taxation (Q991396) (← links)
- A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory (Q1711718) (← links)
- A functional limit theorem for coin tossing Markov chains (Q2028965) (← links)
- New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting (Q2067400) (← links)
- On the probability of default in a market with price clustering and jump risk (Q2175460) (← links)
- Wasserstein convergence rates for random bit approximations of continuous Markov processes (Q2208948) (← links)
- Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics (Q2397637) (← links)
- Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks (Q2399679) (← links)
- Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts (Q2682005) (← links)
- A result on the Laplace transform associated with the sticky Brownian motion on an interval (Q3384665) (← links)
- Job Protection versus Contracts At‐Will: Trading‐Off Entrenchment and Shirking (Q4684748) (← links)
- Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance (Q5003725) (← links)
- On first passage times of sticky reflecting diffusion processes with double exponential jumps (Q5109497) (← links)
- Termination as an incentive device (Q6053658) (← links)
- Dynamic regulation on innovation and adoption of green technology with information asymmetry (Q6077330) (← links)
- General diffusion processes as limit of time-space Markov chains (Q6187474) (← links)
- Delegating trial and error (Q6537225) (← links)
- Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents (Q6665675) (← links)
