Pages that link to "Item:Q492810"
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The following pages link to Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (Q492810):
Displaying 15 items.
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict (Q688540) (← links)
- Self-selective social choice functions (Q930487) (← links)
- Manipulability of choice aggregations (Q1206335) (← links)
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences (Q1331066) (← links)
- On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules (Q1882190) (← links)
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures (Q1908005) (← links)
- On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules (Q2128950) (← links)
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules (Q2236184) (← links)
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (Q2365784) (← links)
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions (Q2386337) (← links)
- Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation (Q2432497) (← links)
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules (Q2432505) (← links)
- Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain (Q2568816) (← links)
- The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (Q5053687) (← links)
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation (Q5053694) (← links)
