Pages that link to "Item:Q5891528"
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The following pages link to Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q5891528):
Displaying 28 items.
- Approximate composable truthful mechanism design (Q344791) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions without money (Q521808) (← links)
- Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles (Q932809) (← links)
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness (Q1651232) (← links)
- A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions (Q1735729) (← links)
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets (Q1753496) (← links)
- The cross-entropy method for the winner determination problem in combinatorial auctions (Q2209236) (← links)
- Online pricing for multi-type of items (Q2257292) (← links)
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach (Q2345944) (← links)
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms (Q2454572) (← links)
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable (Q2512655) (← links)
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions (Q2516249) (← links)
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (Q2519488) (← links)
- Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation (Q2796397) (← links)
- Truthfulness and Approximation with Value-Maximizing Bidders (Q2819462) (← links)
- Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World (Q2959835) (← links)
- Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations (Q3177762) (← links)
- Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods (Q3196307) (← links)
- (Q3455573) (← links)
- Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities (Q3460791) (← links)
- Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable (Q3586382) (← links)
- Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the Vapnik--Chervonenkis Dimension (Q4602545) (← links)
- Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders (Q4997307) (← links)
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming (Q5395669) (← links)
- Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms (Q5419036) (← links)
- Composable and efficient mechanisms (Q5495791) (← links)
- Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions (Q5918584) (← links)
- Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions (Q5918751) (← links)