Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames (Q1071665)

Let \(\Gamma =(N,S,P)\) be a noncooperative game, where \(N=\{1,...,n\}\) is the set of players, S is the joint strategy space, \(s\in S\) and \(P(s)=(P_ 1(s),...,P_ n(s))\in R^ n\) is the payoff vector. A T period repeated game \(\Gamma_ T\) and a trigger strategy for this game are defined. The payoff of the player \(i\in N\) in this games is \(\Sigma^ T_{t=0}\alpha^ T_ iP_ i(s_ t)\), where \(s_ t\in S\). A characterization of this game is given and it is shown that \(\Gamma_ T\) has a trigger strategy equilibrium if the set of multiple equilibria satisfies some conditions.