Fairness, the veil of ignorance and social choice (Q1111901)

A point of departure for this study is the recognition that various individuals may have different opinions about the exact form a social welfare function should have. To obtain some kind of amalgamation of differing individual social preferences, a modified version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance is used and a definition of social efficiency suggested and analyzed. A socially efficient state is defined by means of endogenous and individual veils of ignorance and, in addition, the Pareto principle. Efficiency may be described as a situation where individuals with similar social preferences constitute ``subsocieties'' in an optimal manner. Furthermore, a state is fair if it is (socially) efficient and ``equitable''. An extension of the concept of fairness, called weak fairness, is also suggested. The analysis in this study does not presuppose any objective interpersonally comparable measure of utility.