Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games (Q1189702)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 57739
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 57739 |
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Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games (English)
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27 September 1992
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In social choice problems where players may strategically misrepresent their preferences, a profile of preferences is called self-optimal if reporting them is a Nash equilibrium given that they are the true preferences. Self-optimality can be interpreted as a very weak honesty requirement. The self-optimality concept is applied to a utility distortion game in the context of bargaining; this yields a characterization of efficient Nash equilibria.
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efficiency
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self-optimality
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Nash equilibrium
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utility distortion game
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bargaining
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