Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with \( L^*\)-majorized preference correspondences (Q1193174)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 62052
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with \( L^*\)-majorized preference correspondences |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 62052 |
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Equilibria of non-compact generalized games with \( L^*\)-majorized preference correspondences (English)
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27 September 1992
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The paper gives a general formulation of the fundamental fixed point theorem for correspondences which is used to prove existence of equilibria in abstract economies. The authors show that their formulation of the problem may be reduced to the standard version. This is applied to existence of equilibrium; the assumptions on the abstract economy are essentially a reformulation of the standard conditions for existence.
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fundamental fixed point theorem for correspondences
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existence of equilibria
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abstract economies
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