A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures (Q1296498)

The author offers a new axiomatization of the Owen value (a generalization of the Shapley value) for games with coalition structures. The alternative characterization of the Owen value is based on an associated game. The present axiomatization is an associated consistency axiom based on an associated game that is not a reduced game. The author shows that Owen value is the only one satisfying a consistency requirement along with other standard properties which makes it unnecessary to perform a particular type of manipulation. More axiomatizations may be found in the articles by \textit{S. Hart} and \textit{M. Kurz} [Econometrica 51, 1047-1064 (1983; Zbl 0523.90097)] and \textit{E. Winter} [Games Econ. Behav. 4, 132-144 (1992; Zbl 0796.90074)].