Further explanations of the Gödel scenario of the mind -- a reply to Prof. Graham Priest (Q1313376)

In ``Consistency, mechanicalness and the logic of the mind'' [ibid. 90, 145-179 (1992; Zbl 0752.03002)], the author argued that arguments of \textit{J. Lucas} and the reviewer commit a fallacy of equivocation concerning the notion of proof. In ``Yu and your mind'' [ibid. 95, 459-460 (1993; Zbl 0791.03001)], the reviewer replied that only the standard notion of proof was at issue in his argument, and that, for this, his argument goes through. The present paper is a reply. In as far as the reviewer understands the main point, it is that his original argument works only for the other notion of proof. However, it does not point out where the argument fails for the standard notion.