The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. (Q1395323)
From MaRDI portal
 | This is the item page for this Wikibase entity, intended for internal use and editing purposes. Please use this page instead for the normal view: The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940685
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1940685 |
Statements
The general solution to the principal-agent problem with symmetric information under risk conditions. (English)
0 references
1 July 2003
0 references
In this paper, a general solution to the principal-agent problem is obtained under minimal constraints on the parameters of the model. The majority of studies of the principal-agent problem consider the possibility of using the first-order approach for determining the best strategy of the principal. Here, the author develops another, more general, approach to solving this problem.
0 references
hierarchical games
0 references
strategy
0 references
Principal-Agent problem
0 references
general solution
0 references
model
0 references
penalty control
0 references
