Cost allocation in shortest path games (Q1396937)

Some shortest path problems are associated with a class of cooperative games. The authors show, that their shortest path games have a nonempty core. They give methods for finding elements of the core. In this framework the authors can also prove the coincidence of the core with the bargaining sets of \textit{M. Davis} and \textit{M. Maschler} [Bull. Am. Math. Soc. 69, 106--108 (1963; Zbl 0114.12501)] and \textit{A. Mas-Colell} [J. Math. Econ. 18, 129--139 (1989; Zbl 0676.90011)]. Finally noncooperative games are constructed with a relation of their strong Nash equilibria to the core allocation of the considered shortest path cooperative games.