Truth and its nature (if any). Papers from the international colloquium ``The nature of truth (if any)'', Prague, Czech Republic, September 1996 (Q1594816)

[The articles of this volume will not be indexed individually.] The volume contains 16 essays on the theory of truth. They focus mainly on the problem of whether truth is a substantial notion with a genuine content or a purely formal device, as the deflationists would have it. Some of the papers invoke technical results, but all papers are informal and discuss the theory of truth at a philosophical level. The volume is divided into four parts. The first historical part features papers by Gary Kemp, A.~W.~Carus, Majeda Omar on Frege's, Carnap's and James's views on truth, respectively. All remaining papers in the volume are concerned with Tarski's theory of truth and its offspring like deflationist theories or Davidson's approach to semantics. The papers by Jan Woleński, Petr Kolář, Frederick Stoutland and Ilkka Niiniluoto in the second part as well as Jaroslav Peregrin's introductory remarks deal with Tarski's theory of truth and, in particular, with the relationship between Tarski's theory and correspondence theories of truth. The authors of the papers in the last two parts reject explicit definitions of truth. However, they disagree on the question of whether truth is a substantial notion or not. The papers in the third part by Donald Davidson, Jeff Malpas, Manuel García-Carpintero and Vladimír Svoboda discuss or advance conceptions of truth which are in the one way or the other substantial. All papers in this part are related to Davidson's theory of truth. The final part is devoted to the discussion of deflationism. Paul Horwich defends his deflationist approach to truth, while Jerry Seligman, Edo Pivcevic and Predrag Cicovacki attack different aspects of deflationism. Contents: \textit{Jaroslav Peregrin}, ``Tarski's legacy (introductory remarks)'' (pp. vii--xviii); \textit{Gary Kemp}, ``Frege: assertions, truth and meaning'' (pp. 1-14); \textit{A. W. Carus}, ``Carnap, syntax, and truth'' (pp. 15-35); \textit{Majeda Omar}, ``James's conception of truth'' (pp. 37-50); \textit{Jan Woleński}, ``Semantic conception of truth as a philosophical theory'' (pp. 51-65); \textit{Petr Kolář}, ``Truth, correspondence, satisfaction'' (pp. 67-79); \textit{Frederick Stoutland}, ``Do we need correspondence truth?'' (pp. 81-90); \textit{Ilkka Niiniluoto}, ``Tarskian truth as correspondence -- replies to some objections'' (pp. 91-104); \textit{Donald Davidson}, ``The centrality of truth'' (pp. 105-115); \textit{Jeff Malpas}, ``Mapping the structure of truth: Davidson contra Rorty'' (pp. 117-127); \textit{Manuel García-Carpintero}, ``The explanatory value of truth theories embodying the semantic conception'' (pp. 129-148); \textit{Vladimír Svoboda}, ``Negative truth and knowledge'' (pp. 149-161); \textit{Paul Horwich}, ``Deflationary truth, aboutness and meaning'' (pp. 163-171); \textit{Jerry Seligman}, ``The substance of deflation'' (pp. 173-186); \textit{Edo Pivcevic}, ``Does the strategy of austerity work?'' (pp. 187-201); \textit{Predrag Cicovacki}, ``Rethinking the concept of truth: a critique of deflationism'' (pp. 203-221).