Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies (Q1599832)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751410
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1751410 |
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Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies (English)
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27 February 2004
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A microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies is introduced. The model is used to: (1) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy; (2) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions; (3) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting compaign spending; (4) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome.
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politician
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rational voter
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multiple lobby
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model
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campaign finance
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common agency
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elections
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