A syntactic framework with probabilistic beliefs and conditionals for the analysis of strategic form games (Q1610627)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784304
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | A syntactic framework with probabilistic beliefs and conditionals for the analysis of strategic form games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1784304 |
Statements
A syntactic framework with probabilistic beliefs and conditionals for the analysis of strategic form games (English)
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20 August 2002
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A syntactic framework for the analysis of strategic-form games is developed, based on a combination of doxastic, probabilistic and conditional propositional logic. The use of conditionals makes it possible to represent a strategic-form game by a logical formula. The framework is used to prove a syntactic version of a result on Nash equilibrium conjectures due to \textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{A. Brandenburger} [Econometrica 63, 1161-1180 (1995; Zbl 0841.90125)].
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conditional logic
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doxastic logic
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probabilistic logic
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strategic-form games
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Nash equilibrium
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