On the security of the digital signature algorithm (Q1611356)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1785702
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | On the security of the digital signature algorithm |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1785702 |
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On the security of the digital signature algorithm (English)
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21 August 2002
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The authors develop a new key-recovery attack against the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). It is a variant of known attacks by Boneh et al. and is also based on lattice basis reduction techniques. They prove that the system will be insecure if half of the total number of bits in the secret and ephemeral keys (or in two ephemeral keys) are known provided that the unknown bits are contiguous.
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digital signature security
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