The role of the decision-making regime on cooperation in a workgroup social dilemma: an examination of cyberloafing (Q1651834)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900993
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The role of the decision-making regime on cooperation in a workgroup social dilemma: an examination of cyberloafing |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6900993 |
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The role of the decision-making regime on cooperation in a workgroup social dilemma: an examination of cyberloafing (English)
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10 July 2018
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Summary: A burgeoning problem facing organizations is the loss of workgroup productivity due to cyberloafing. The current paper examines how changes in the decision-making rights about what workgroup members can do on the job affect cyberloafing and subsequent work productivity. We compare two different types of decision-making regimes: autocratic decision-making and group voting. Using a laboratory experiment to simulate a data-entry organization, we find that, while autocratic decision-making and group voting regimes both curtail cyberloafing (by over 50\%), it is only in group voting that there is a substantive improvement (of 38\%) in a cyberloafer's subsequent work performance. Unlike autocratic decision-making, group voting leads to workgroups outperforming the control condition where cyberloafing could not be stopped. Additionally, only in the group voting regime did production levels of cyberloafers and non-loafers converge over time.
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autocratic decision-making
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cyberloafing
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group voting
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social dilemma
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workgroup performance
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0.6547023057937622
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0.6473047137260437
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0.6433331966400146
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0.6182758808135986
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0.6120262742042542
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