The emotional moves of a rational actor: smiles, scowls, and other credible messages (Q1656925)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916593
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | The emotional moves of a rational actor: smiles, scowls, and other credible messages |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6916593 |
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The emotional moves of a rational actor: smiles, scowls, and other credible messages (English)
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13 August 2018
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Summary: Many scholars turn to emotions to understand irrational behavior. We do the opposite: we turn to rationality and game theory to understand people's emotions. We discuss a striking theory of emotions that began with the game theory of credible threats and promises, then was enriched by evolutionary biology and psychology, and now is being tested in psychological experiments. We review some of these experiments which use economic games to set up strategic situations with real payoffs. The experiments test whether a player's emotional expressions lend credibility to promises, threats, and claims of danger or hardship. The results offer insights into the hidden strategies behind a warm smile, an angry scowl, a look of terror, and eyes of despair.
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emotion
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game theory
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facial expression
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commitment
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signaling
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0.7939314
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