The Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game (Q1656955)

Summary: This paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty's motives and incentives. We endow Monty and the contestant with common prior probabilities \((p)\) about the motives of Monty and show that, under certain conditions on \(p\), the unique equilibrium is one in which the contestant is indifferent between switching and not switching. This coincides and agrees with the typical responses and explanations by experimental subjects. In particular, we show that our formulation can explain the experimental results in [\textit{S. E. Page}, Econ. Lett. 61, No. 2, 175--180 (1998; Zbl 0912.90006)], that more people gradually choose switch as the number of doors in the problem increases.