Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions (Q1712139)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7003972
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7003972 |
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Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions (English)
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21 January 2019
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Summary: We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was consistent with benchmark theory: average reserve price for these sellers was independent of the number of bidders and equaled the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however deviated from the theoretical benchmark: on average, they tended to shade reserve price below the predicted level and positively relate it to the number of bidders.
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reserve price
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first-price auction
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experience
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seller learning
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