Analysis and design of electoral systems (Q1779201)

Contributions: -- Paul Edelman, Measuring Power in At-Large Representation. p.727 -- Remzi Sanver (joint with Steven J. Brams), Voter Souvereignty. p.728 -- Marc Kilgour (joint with Steven J. Brams and Remzi Sanver), A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties. p.730 -- Victoriano Ramírez, From Principles of Representation to Electoral Methods. p.732 -- Friedrich Pukelsheim, BAZI -- A Java Program for Proportional Representation. p.735 -- Mathias Drton (joint with K. Schuster, F. Pukelsheim and N. R. Draper), Seat Biases of Apportionment Methods for Proportional Representation. p.737 -- Martin Fehndrich, Negative Weights of Votes and Overhang Seats in the German Federal Electoral Law. p.739 -- William Zwicker, The Role of the Mean and the Median in Social Choice Theory. p.741 -- Fuad Aleskerov, Formal Analysis of the Results of Elections. p.742 -- Hannu Nurmi, Procedure-Dependence of Electoral Outcomes. p.744 -- Donald G. Saari, The Mathematical Source of Voting Paradoxes. p.745 -- Christian Klamler, On the Closeness Aspect of Three Voting Rules: Borda, Copeland and Maximin. p.747 -- Thomas Ratliff, Selecting Committees Without Complete Preferences. p.749 -- Jack H. Nagel, A Question for Mathematicians: Would Disputed Elections Be (Sufficiently) Less Probable If U.S. Presidents Were Directly Elected? p.752 -- Vincent Merlin, Probability Models for the Analysis of Voting Rules in a Federal Union. p.753 -- Michel Regenwetter, Foundations of Behavioral Social Choice Research. p.754 -- Michel Balinski (joint with Mourad Baïou), Matchings and Allocations. p.757 -- Moshé Machover, Analysis of QM Rules in the Draft Constitution for Europe Proposed by the European Convention 2003. p.758 -- Werner Kirsch, The Treaty of Nice and the Council of Ministers: A Mathematical Analysis of the Distribution of Power. p.760 -- Thomas Jahnke, Assignments of Seats as a Modelling Example in the Classroom of Upper Secondary Schools. p.761 -- Bruno Simeone (joint with Isabella Lari and Frederica Ricca), A Weighted Voronoi Diagram Approach to Political Districting. p.764 -- Maurice Salles, Voting in Social Choice Theory. p.767 -- Steven J. Brams (joint with Todd R. Kaplan), Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System. p.768