Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs. (Q1862734)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1885715
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs. |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1885715 |
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Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: The role of beliefs. (English)
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2002
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This paper considers the Nash bargaining problem when the outcome is uncertain and agents do not have a common prior over than uncertainty. Both the risk neutral and the constant absolute risk aversion cases are studied. The main comparative statics result is that if the agent 1's beliefs move further away from agent 2's, then agent 2 is made better off.
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Nash bargain
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uncertain outcome
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common prior
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0.8997639
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0.87808204
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0.8551848
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0.8464447
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0.8460287
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0.8430016
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0.83929074
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0.83630013
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