Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness revisited (Q1940707)

In the epistemic logics previously discussed by the authors, it is not possible to model an agent who is uncertain about whether he is aware of all formulas. To overcome this problem, the authors keep the syntax of their earlier paper [Games Econ. Behav. 67, No. 2, 503--525 (2009; Zbl 1189.03023)], but allow models where different languages could be associated with each world. They also introduce a new axiomatization for such a logic. Under a natural assumption, they show that some fragments of this logic are equivalent to ones proposed by others. The authors motivate their discussion as follows: ``Primary-care physicians know that specialists are aware of things that could improve a patient's treatment that they are not aware of. Investors know that investment fund companies may be aware of issues involving the financial market that could result in higher profits that they are not aware of. It thus becomes of interest to model knowledge of lack of awareness.'' They give no argument why such modeling would be useful in the practice of primary-care physicians or investors. According to my opinion, unawareness (ignorance) of humans stems from abuse of dogmas and stereotypes. Unawareness, which is considered in the article, should be applied to a (very) artificial intelligence.