Alternative action theory. Simultaneously a critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's practical philosophy. Translated from the German by Jacques Zwart (Q1975744)

This book is an English translation (by {J. Zwart}) of the author's Alternative Handlungstheorie (Böhlau Verlag, 1996). It is not so much an essay in philosophical logic, as perhaps a philosophical propaedeutic to such a study, introducing the author's foundations for a theory of action and social institutions generally. These lie centrally in a distinction between descriptive/theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, in which the latter is expressly highlighted, and characterized by intentionality and teleology. This is the realm of decision, value, norm. From a logical point of view, of greatest interest is the injunction to ``take Jørgensen's dilemma seriously''. The author is a staunch non-cognitivist with respect to normative discourse, and thus must confront the problem of accounting for a \textit{logic} of norms when norms, or normative statements, are not truth-evaluable. His response is to propose a bifurcated semantics in which practical (normative) statements, though lacking truth-value, have another kind of value, validity, which grounds their logic. No formal details of this semantics are developed. Standard deontic logic is sharply criticized on various grounds, and alternative principles proposed, but again no detailed proof-theory or semantics is presented. Other topics discussed include the question of free will, the nature of institutions, and the conception of democracy. A running theme through the entire book is a critique of G. H. von Wright's work on action theory and deontic logic, but it is always from a sympathetic point of view. The volume ends with an `Homage' to von Wright, which, however, says very little about von Wright and is chiefly a criticism of the later Wittgenstein's views of philosophy.