Leśniewski's conception of logic (Q2702275)

The authors aim to present a reconstruction of Leśniewski's general logical position, which is based on analysis of his logical theories and his references to other authors. They stress that, to understand Leśniewski, it is important to understand the following two facts: his logical paradigm was rooted in traditional rather than modern logic, and his system of foundations of mathematics was developed following the not popular idea that mathematics is a (formal) theory of reality. Discussed are the aspects of the modern form of logic which were unacceptable to Leśniewski and his views on denotation and connotation of expressions, on synonymy, and on distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. After noticing that protothetics, ontology and mereology may be considered as formalizations of truth, of existence and of substance, respectively, the authors conclude that ``the hypothesis that Leśniewski's fundamental intention was perhaps to seek to formalize \textit{Methaphysics} is perhaps the deepest and clearest explanation of his unshakeable faith in the superiority of the traditional theory of logic''.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 0946.00016].