Negation, absurdity and contrariety (Q2715524)

The author presents a `rule-based, anti-realist or constructivist account of negation', by assuming basic contrarieties and using co-inductive definitions of proofs and disproofs, without having to make appeal to the absurdity constant. These considerations lead the author to a system of intuitionistic relevant logic [see \textit{N. Tennant}, ``Perfect validity, entailment and paraconsistency'', Studia Logica 43, 181-200 (1984; Zbl 0582.03011), ``Natural deduction and sequent calculus for intuitionistic relevant logic'', J. Symb. Logic 52, 665-680 (1987; Zbl 0652.03010)] and to the conclusion that negation should be taken as primitive, and it should be explained how a grasp of its sense arises from one's prior grasp of primitive metaphysical contrarieties within an interpreted language.NEWLINENEWLINEFor the entire collection see [Zbl 0957.00012].